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Resumo
 O presente artigo objetiva analisar e comparar como que a indústria do petróleo foi afetada pela chegada das politicas neoliberais 
no Brasil e na Argentina durante a década de 90. Este foco de análise permite proporcionar aos pesquisadores da área de huma-
nidades um melhor entendimento de como as politicas neoliberais afetaram o setor energético de ambos os países. Outra área de 
interesse para esse paper e estabelecer através da análise comparativa como que as politicas neoliberais afetaram os dois países no 
campo econômico, com possíveis diferenças e semelhanças.
Abstract
 The current paper intends to analyze and compare how the oil industry was affected by the rise of neoliberal policies in Brazil and 
Argentina during the early 1990s. This focus of analysis allows researchers in social sciences to have a better understanding of how 
the neoliberal policies approached the energy market in both countries, and how that was pivotal to implement a “free market” ap-
proach to the oil industry.  Another area of interest to this paper is to use the comparative analysis of Brazil and Argentina in order 
to  bring evidence on how neoliberalism developed itself in both countries, and most importantly, which was its economic impact 
over that period.
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y the second decade of the twenty-
first century it is certainly possible to 
claim that a new age of state dirigisme 
in Latin America had begun. The commanding 
heights of the economy are back to the tight 
control of the state, making the neoliberal wave 
of the 1990s seem a remote memory from a 
distant past. Political leaders such as Lula in 
Brazil and the Kirchners in Argentina built 
their political careers on the idea that only the 
destruction of the neoliberal model brought by 
Cardoso and Menem could bring prosperity back 
to Latin America. What Latin America has seen 
since then, at least in Brazil and Argentina, is 
the persistence of old problems such as poverty, 
urban violence, and corruption. Attached to 
that, inflation and dangerous public deficits are 
back, marking a new period where low growth 
and social strife have become the norm, as the 
recent protests in Brazil and Argentina have 
demonstrated.
This change in the economic landscape 
in Brazil and Argentina since 2002 has been 
welcomed by most intellectuals in both countries; 
there is still among them the belief that state 
dirigisme was the only possible solution in order 
to combine economic growth with social equality. 
From that perspective, the debate about oil has 
gained a mythical status. The privatization of 
Yaciemientos Petrolificos Fiscales (YPF) and the 
partial privatization of Petrobras are considered 
by some intellectuals the greatest sin of the 
neoliberal age. Marked by what they consider 
to be a “sellout” of the national interests to the 
“exploitative” foreign capital of the developed 
nations. According to the leftist parties and 
intelligentsia, the new Petrobras and YPF could 
not serve their own people as private companies. 
From their perspective, private companies only 
focus on profit while public companies focus on 
development. In the works of Elana Shever and 
James Petras about oil and the neoliberal state in 
Brazil and Argentina, that perspective becomes 
clear.1
For twenty years this troop of corrupt 
elites with no national interest working for the 
American puppet master has stood strong in Bra-
zil and Argentina. But, the time has come to his-
toriography to shed new light on the economic 
impact of the political turn to a neoliberal model 
in the 1990s. This essay intends to use oil history 
as a way to provide a different understanding of 
what the neoliberal age meant to Latin America. 
A case study focused on the profound reforms 
that YPF and Petrobras have been through from 
1991 until 2002 may provide important leads on 
how the neoliberal state acted. Above all, it may 
be possible to understand what were its gains and 
where the model failed in bringing meaningful 
change. The goal here is to go beyond the classic 
dichotomy of sellout x pro market that has ma-
rked the political/economic debate in Latin Ame-
rica for over the last century. In order to provide 
a different narrative on the reforms of the oil sec-
tor in Brazil and Argentina, it became necessary 
to combine different sources. An emphasis here 
is given to oil market analysis, that offers a sharp 
contrast with the bipolar narratives that were pre-
sent in Brazil and Argentina during the 1990s. 
In triangulating three different perspectives that 
compasses the government, the opposition, and 
the international market, a more complex narra-
tive emerges. One that perhaps may bring new 
elements to the economic history of Latin Ame-
rica and can provide a more rational debate and 
understanding on the nature of the neoliberal ex-
perience in Latin America.
1 Shever, Elana. 2012. Resources for Reform: Oil and Neoliberalism in 
Argentina. Stanford, California: Stanford University Press. http://site.
ebrary.com/id/10571088.
Petras, James F., and Henry Veltmeyer. 2003. Cardoso’s Brazil: a Land 
for Sale. Lanham, Md: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers.
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The case for reform
In their respective works on oil and 
neoliberalism in Brazil and Argentina, James 
Petras and Elana Shever argued that the 
reforms that Petrobras and YPF went through 
in 1990s were not only unnecessary, but were 
close to being a case of treason perpetrated 
by the governments of Brazil and Argentina. 
Successful was the most common adjective 
used by Petras and Shever in order to describe 
YPF and Petrobras before the neoliberal age. 
Certainly this is something that can be argued 
when we take into consideration the trajectory of 
both companies. Given the fact that Brazil and 
Argentina faced an acute shortage of investment 
capital for the most of the twentieth century 
and both countries were plagued with political 
unrest and economic instability, the rise of YPF 
and Petrobras as oil giants is nothing short of 
a miracle. Both companies indeed helped to 
develop remote regions, dedicated themselves to 
some effective forms of social development, and 
put an amount of capital to develop a national oil 
industry that the giants such as Standard Oil and 
Shell were not willing to invest.
In spite of the corruption and waste that 
marked both companies from the start2 until the 
1970s, for the reasons presented above, their 
record was mainly positive. The problem here 
is that both Petras and Shever did not recognize 
that after 1975 Petrobras and YPF were 
becoming more a part of the problem than a part 
of the solution. According to studies conducted 
during the tenure of Jose Martinez de Hoz as 
finance minister in Argentina (1976-1981), YPF 
needed an injection of capital of US$ 11 billion 
in the 1980s in order to become a company that 
could provide Argentina its dreamed energy 
independence.3 This staggering amount of 
2 YPF was founded in 1922 and Petrobras was created in 1953.
3 Palacio Deheza, Carlos. 1981. El plan Martínez de Hoz y la economía 
argentina. Buenos Aires: Corregidor.
revenue had to be raised by a government that 
by 1981 was owing to foreign governments and 
banks a sum close to US$ 42 billion.4 With an 
economy virtually paralyzed by political chaos 
of the transition to the civilian rule in 1983 and 
with foreign credit lines closed, there was no 
way that the Argentine government could find 
resources to develop YPF’s plentiful oil and 
gas fields. In fact, the Argentine government 
in the 1980s took money from YPF in order to 
cover its budgetary deficits and for all sorts of 
different reasons that were not dedicated to oil 
development. With 56.000 workers spread all 
over the country, by 1989 YPF was losing US$ 
2 billion/year, contributing to a 25% increase 
in Argentina’s foreign debt every year.5 Given 
the dismal scenario faced not only by the YPF, 
but also by the whole country, the need for 
comprehensive reforms was huge. 
The case of Petrobras was very similar 
to YPF, although the Brazilian company had 
an extra responsibility; it had to manage the oil 
imports for the Brazilian economy. Brazil was 
in a very delicate position after 1973, when 
the oil price in the international market soared 
after the OPEC oil embargo that followed the 
Yom Kippur war. The country’s economy grew 
by an average of 12% a year between 1968 and 
1973 and imported about 80% of its oil.6 By 
1976, Petrobras started exploring the Campos 
offshore fields in Rio de Janeiro state, which 
promised to diminish Brazil’s exposure to the 
instability of the international oil market. At 
this particular moment, Petrobras started to face 
similar problems to those faced by YPF. In order 
4 Babb, Sarah L. 2009. Behind the Development Banks Washington 
Politics, World Poverty, and the Wealth of Nations. Chicago: University 
of Chicago Press. http://public.eblib.com/choice/publicfullrecord.
aspx?p=448526.
5 Kamm, Thomas. “South Americans Push Sales of State Assets in 
Swing to Capitalism.” Wall Street Journal (1923 - Current File), Jul 
09, 1991. 2, http://search.proquest.com/docview/135540110?account
id=11091. 
ARGENTINA: Privatisation. Oxford: Oxford Analytica Ltd, 1989, http://
search.proquest.com/docview/192423976?accountid=11091.
6 Republica Federativa do Brasil. Ministério das Minas e Energia. 
1983. Boletim Energético Nacional.
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to further develop its Campos basin and start 
exploration of the new fields of Santos basin, 
Brazil needed a staggering amount of capital 
inflow. Given the fact that all the meaningful 
Brazilian oil fields were in the ocean, Petrobras’ 
needs for capital and state of the art technology 
far surpassed those needed by YPF.
Petrobras ambitious plans were stalled 
by the Brazilian Debt Crisis that fully emerged in 
1982. Brazil had at that point the world’s largest 
foreign debt, that stood close to US$ 92 billion.7 
In order to deal with its debt issues, the country 
promised to follow a draconian fiscal adjustment 
suggested by the International Monetary 
Fund and the Reagan administration. Double 
digit inflation, economic recession, and urban 
violence affected the expansion of Petrobras 
offshore exploration projects and infrastructure 
expansion. The 1980s were a tough time for the 
Brazilian oil industry, since the country was not 
growing, the thirst for oil diminished. After the 
end of the dictatorship, in 1985, there was no 
clear policy for Petrobras. The largest company 
in Brazil was inefficient due to the lack of capital 
for expansion and a burdensome payroll dictated 
by strong unions.8 
During the long 1980s, Brazil found 
solace in two events that unfolded over that 
decade. First was that after the global recession 
of 1981-1983, oil prices slumped from its peak 
in 1980. Brazil was still importing most of its oil, 
but its bill was smaller due to the price slump 
in the global markets and the severe recession 
at home.9 The second was the blossoming of the 
sugar cane ethanol program called Pro-Alcool, 
that started by the mid 1970s  This pioneer 
7 Babb, Sarah L. 2009. Behind the Development Banks Washington 
Politics, World Poverty, and the Wealth of Nations. Chicago: University 
of Chicago Press. http://public.eblib.com/choice/publicfullrecord.
aspx?p=448526.
8 Randall, Laura. 1993. The Political Economy of Brazilian Oil. 
Westport, Conn: Praeger.
9 Republica Federativa do Brasil. Ministério das Minas e Energia. 
1983. Boletim Energético Nacional.
program, organized by the military regime, 
finally started to payoff during the 1980s. 
Foreign car companies in Brazil were producing 
cars that were adapted to ethanol. Those cars, 
although there were still some technological 
hurdles to overcome, became a huge success in 
the 1980s.10 The main trouble faced by the users 
of sugar ethanol is that the producers tried to 
keep the prices artificially high by keeping the 
sugar cane crop artificially low. That model also 
pleased the famous “colonels” of the Brazilian 
northeast, where the new found wealth with 
ethanol helped to “fuel” patronage networks that 
went from small cities to president Jose Sarney’s 
closest allies.11
2. Time for reform.
By the early 1990s, after several 
failed attempts to control inflation and restore 
economic growth, chaos seemed to have become 
the permanent order in Latin America. Influenced 
by the success of the Reagan and Thatcher pro-
market economic measures, a new generation 
of Latin-American leaders believed that it was 
the time to shy away from strict state dirigisme. 
The embodiment of this new school of thought 
in Brazil and Argentina were Fernando Collor 
de Mello (1990-1992) and Carlos Saul Menem 
(1989-1999). Both promised a quick fix to the 
economic maladies faced by both countries, 
especially the hyperinflation. 
 In such reformist environment, it is 
no wonder that both Petrobras and YPF were 
on the top of the list for meaningful changes. 
Both companies were losing money and were 
not collaborating towards energy independence 
that both countries aspired to have.12 Menem 
10 Meyer, D., L. Mytelka, R. Press, E.L. Dall’Oglio, de Sousa Jr, P.T. 
& A. Grubler. (2012). Brazilian Ethanol: Unpacking a Success Story 
of Energy Technology Innovation. Historical Case Studies of Energy 
Technology Innovation in: Chapter 24, The Global Energy Assessment. 
Grubler A., Aguayo, F., Gallagher, K.S., Hekkert, M., Jiang, K., Mytelka, 
L., Neij, L., Nemet, G. & C. Wilson. Cambridge University Press: 
Cambridge, UK.
11 “Uma ressaca a vista”. Veja, February 19th, 1986.
12 Treisman, Daniel. “Cardoso, Menem, and Machiavelli: Political 
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and Collor sold the idea they were willing to 
wage a war against the waste and the corruption 
of the state companies. Since the Brazilian and 
the Argentine states were burdened by servicing 
the debt payment with the IMF, it was almost 
impossible for the government to inject the 
capital necessary to restore both companies. This 
dilemma also applied to other Latin-American 
countries in other areas such as electricity and 
telecommunication. Brazil and Argentina missed 
the technology (IT) revolution that marked all 
utility sectors in the 1980s, generating huge gaps 
in terms of technology and productivity when 
compared to similar companies in the developed 
world. Given this conundrum, there was the 
beginning of a consensus among Brazilian 
and Argentine elites, the IMF and the Bush 
administration. In order for these companies 
overcome the IT gap, only private capital could 
provide the financial backing for that. The 
famous Washington Consensus was not about 
privatization only for the sake of privatization, 
but it was about allocating a surplus of 
investment capital that existed in the developed 
world in order to build modern infrastructure 
and corporate behavior in Latin America. That 
modernization was needed was a consensus; that 
private capital was the best way to lead to that 
modernization was far from being a consensus.13
The perfect example about the lack of 
consensus regarding the Washington Consensus 
was Carlos Menem. When Menem was 
elected president in 1989, he was the Peronist 
stalwart, cursing any kind of neoliberal reform 
for Argentina. Menem was elected with the 
support of traditional Peronists, the poor and 
the unions, all the social groups that he would 
Tactics and Privatization in Latin America.” Studies in Comparative 
International Development.September 2003, Volume 38, Issue 3, pp 
93-109.
13  Williamson, John. 1990. Latin American Adjustment: How Much Has 
Happened? Washington, D.C.: Institute for International Economics
Harvey, David. 2005. A Brief History of Neoliberalism. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. Pp. 30-153.
turn against him later in his presidency. In spite 
of a populist discourse and some attempts to 
implement mild reforms in Argentina, by 1990 
Menem had already realized that he was risking 
having to face a country in full social anomy. 
Hyperinflation, looting, and urban violence were 
common scenes in Argentina’s major cities. 
Influenced by more conservative members of his 
political alliance such as Julia Maria Alzogaray 
and the top executives of the powerful industrial 
group Bunge y Born Menem was persuaded to 
change his course.14 
Menem understood that only an alliance 
with the most conservative sectors of Argentine 
politics would guarantee his political survival as 
president. That was the moment when Menem 
was converted to the gospel of neoliberalism.15 
What is interesting is that this conversion did 
not result from pressure from the American 
government or from any personal conviction in 
favor of that economic model; it was a pure act 
of political survival. And the president did not 
waste time in implementing his new strategy; the 
president of YPF Octavio Frigeri confirmed to 
the Wall Street Journal that the government was 
moving ahead with the full privatization of the 
YPF.16 Also in 1990, the Menem administration 
privatized the telephone company (Entel) and 
the state airline (Aerolineas Argentinas). It was 
a remarkable turn of events. 
Fernando Collor promised a radical 
reform of the Brazilian state; in 1990 he 
argued that Brazil’s malaise was to blame on 
the spendthrift federal government. Waste and 
corruption in all spheres of power could only be 
fought with a pro market reform where Collor 
advocated for privatization and a free trade 
14 ARGENTINA: Privatisation. Oxford: Oxford Analytica Ltd, 1989, 
http://search.proquest.com/docview/192423976?accountid=11091.
15 Wornat, Olga, Katherine Cortés Guerrieri, and Carola Iujvidin. 
1999. Menem: la vida privada. Buenos Aires: Planeta.
16  Frigerio, Octavio. “Hurdles Won’t Block Privatization of Argentina’s 
Oil Industry.” Wall Street Journal (1923 - Current File), Jul 06, 1990. 1, 
http://search.proquest.com/docview/135479062?accountid=11091. 
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platform from day one. Like Menem, Collor 
previously was the governor of a poor state 
(Alagoas) where only the mastery of traditional 
patronage networks could lift any candidate to 
the upper echelons of power from Maceio to 
Brasilia. After a hard fought election against the 
Workers Party candidate Lula, Collor almost had 
a carte blanche to implement its reforms. But, 
soon he realized that in Brazil the opposition to 
privatization was even larger than in Argentina. 
Brazil’s post dictatorship political life 
is marked by a coalition presidential system, 
that is controlled by political parties that only 
seek patronage from the State rather than any 
ideological creed.17 Collor needed the support 
of those parties in order to guarantee any sort 
of governability; these parties relied on state 
companies as a source of political tradeoff. 
That political imperative made Collor go slow 
with his ambitious privatization program, 
where Petrobras was a sure target.18 Ideological 
opposition from the left and political opposition 
from the Center-right made the implementation 
of his plans something impossible. When 
Fernando Collor resigned from power following 
corruption charges in 1992, he left a trail of a 
severe economic crisis, a paltry softening of 
Brazil’s trade barriers, and only a minor re-
form of the oil industry. A major overhaul was 
a task that would have to be carried out by his 
successor, Itamar Franco.
In sum, the economic crisis that hit 
Brazil and Argentina by the late 1970s obliged 
both countries to look for a development model 
different from the state planned economy. Both 
countries struggled with the lack of capital, 
unstable currency, and social strife. Given that 
17  Santos, Fabiano and Vilarouca, Márcio Grijó. Political Institutions 
and Governability from FHC to Lula. University of Pittsburgh Press . 
(2008) http://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt6wr9x1.9 
18  “Collor encara o tigre.” Veja, May 16th, 1990.
“Paginas em Branco.” Veja, November 4th, 1992.
Randall, Laura. 1993. The Political Economy of Brazilian Oil. Westport, 
Conn: Praeger.
scenario and the burden generated by the debt 
servicing, Menem and Collor adopted a neoliberal 
corollary, although adapted to the specificities of 
their own societies. The oil companies were not 
immune to this wave of change, and privatization 
was seen as the only way out for the problems 
of capital and efficiency faced by Petrobras and 
YPF. 
Menem had a broader and more powerful 
political coalition as the leader of the Justicialista 
Party, but the president had to align himself 
with the neoliberal members of his party and 
of the Buenos Aires elite in order to guarantee 
his political survival. Collor, elected by a small 
political party (PRN) depended on patronage 
networks to put his coalition in place. The 
Brazilian coalition system always has benefitted 
from the perks of administering large state 
companies as Petrobras, whose presidency has 
been often been used for horse-trading. While 
Menem was persuaded by the right wing of his 
party to move forward with a full privatization 
program, Collor had to refrain from his original 
goal of privatizing Petrobras. The choices made 
by Collor and Menem had less to do with any 
grand design made by the US government or the 
IMF than with the political and financial needs 
of each country. The choices made in the early 
1990s by Brazil and Argentina demonstrated that 
there was not only one neoliberal model in Latin 
America, but  there were many, each following 
economic and political particularities of  their 
respective countries, as the reforms in the oil 
industry that will be described in the next chapter 
demonstrate.
3. Sacrilege – the privatization of 
YPF and Petrobras.
 The neoliberal wave in Latin America 
would reach its apex during the mid 1990s. 
In that period, the scope and intensity of the 
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reforms carried out by Brazil and Argentina 
impressed foreign and domestic observers alike. 
As affirmed in the previous section, economic 
constraints and political needs pushed Brazilian 
and Argentine leaders towards this course, 
although by 1994, Argentina had a lot more to 
show than Brazil in terms of neoliberal reforms. 
Those reforms targeted all areas of the economy, 
where a major overhaul was indeed necessary. 
The oil market was not immune to 
that, and changes that intended to bring growth 
in productivity and profitability to YPF and 
Petrobras were underway. The reforms and the 
privatization of YPF and Petrobras are one of 
the most important chapters in recent Latin-
American economic history. Promoting the 
understanding of this moment helps scholars to 
perceive how the nature of neoliberal reforms 
changed from country to country and how the 
domestic power brokers sometimes had more 
importance than the foreign capital. Reforms 
only moved ahead when a comfort zone was 
reached among domestic and foreign interests, 
which brings a whole different nuance to the 
traditional perception that foreign investors 
dictated everything.
By 1991, Carlos Menem had been fully 
converted to the neoliberal camp. The president 
was living a honeymoon with the conservative 
wing of the Justicialista Party, the IMF, and the 
Bush administration. Menem even sent military 
support to the allied effort at operation Desert 
Storm during the First Gulf War. At that point, 
Entel and Aerolineas Argentinas were privatized, 
and the Menem administration had set YPF as 
its next target. The president wanted it to be 
flawless, since YPF was the crowning jewel of 
the Argentine state, valued between US$ 5 and 
8 billion.19 With oil reserves estimated at more 
19 Qassim, Ali. “Menem Oils the Wheels.” The Banker 143, no. 810 
(08, 1993): 53, http://search.proquest.com/docview/225658005?accou
ntid=11091.
than 2 billion barrels and huge gas reserves, YPF 
one of the most desired state companies in South 
America by the foreign investors.
YPF could only fulfill its great potential 
if it could reform itself. The Argentine oil giant 
had 56.000 workers, and financed not only the 
oil industry; it built airports, hospitals, schools, 
and cinemas. A great part of its employees 
held their jobs through patronage rather than 
qualifications.20 There was no budget control 
of the company and literally nobody knew 
where the money was going and how it was 
being spent. The only fact known about YPF 
was that the Argentine government had to 
cover a US$ 2 billion/year deficit, a situation 
that was unsustainable given the sheer size of 
the Argentine public debt by 1991. The Entel 
and Aerolineas privatizations were made in a 
rush, with no sanitation of those companies 
and with an evident lack of accountability and 
organization. Those auctions were seen as a 
fiasco by international analysts21, since even 
after being privatized those companies were still 
struggling with several lawsuits and strikes that 
stopped almost any meaningful reform. In order 
to avoid this type of situation, Menem decided 
that YPF had to be reorganized before going to 
auction. 
There would be a transitional process to 
be coordinated by Jorge Estenssoro, the former 
president of the Hughes Tools in Argentina. 
Estenssoro was highly regarded as a competent 
oil engineer and disciplined administrator. But, 
the task ahead of him was huge. Labor Unions 
attached to YPF being fiercely against any kind 
of meaningful change. The whole infrastructure 
20  Frigerio, Octavio. “Hurdles Won’t Block Privatization of Argentina’s 
Oil Industry.” Wall Street Journal (1923 - Current File), Jul 06, 1990. 1, 
http://search.proquest.com/docview/135479062?accountid=11091. 
Kamm, Thomas. “South Americans Push Sales of State Assets in Swing 
to Capitalism.” Wall Street Journal (1923 - Current File), Jul 09, 1991. 
2, http://search.proquest.com/docview/135540110?accountid=11091. 
21 Robinson, D. (1993). Argentina Masters the Art of Privatization. Eu-
romoney, 24. Retrieved from http://search.proquest.com/docview/19883
8583?accountid=11091
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of the company was outdated, with the newest 
equipment being from the 1970s. YPF also had 
lots of assets that had nothing to do with oil, and 
were a burden to the company’s budget.22 
During 1991, Argentina was also moving 
ahead with a new stabilization plan known 
as Plano Cavallo. The Cavallo plan fought 
hyperinflation through the full dollarization of 
the economy. In order to guarantee the success of 
the new plan, Argentina had to have high Dollar 
reserves in order to cope with the similar amount 
of Pesos available in the country. In that sense, 
a faster pace of privatization was mandatory in 
order to keep a high flow of Dollars to Argentina’s 
reserve bank. Given that conjuncture, the 
privatization of YPF was instrumental not only 
as a piece of state reform, but also for the survival 
of the stabilization plan.23
The Argentinian government started 
waging its war against the YPF union from the 
inside of the Justicialista Party. Menem used a 
strategy that mixed persuasion and perks with the 
main labor leaders of Argentina. That strategy 
proved to be successful, perks and patronage 
persuaded the main leaders of CGT (acronym) to 
soften up their opposition towards privatization 
as a whole. Similar deals were struck with other 
important leaders from the Justicialista Party 
and Argentine suppliers of YPF that wanted 
guarantees that their businesses with YPF would 
not be affected by the changes that the company 
was going through.24 
While Menem guaranteed through 
backroom deals labor peace at YPF, Estenssoro 
22  Grosse, Robert. “Financial Strategy at YPF.” Thunderbird Inter-
national Business Review 45, no. 1 (Jan, 2003): 93-104, http://search.
proquest.com/docview/202783979?accountid=11091.
23 Szusterman, Celia. Carlos Saúl Menem: Variations on the Theme 
of Populism. Bulletin of Latin American Research, Vol. 19, No. 2, 
Special Issue: Old and New Populism in Latin America (Apr., 2000), 
pp. 193-206
24 Treisman, Daniel. “Cardoso, Menem, and Machiavelli: Political 
Tactics and Privatization in Latin America.” Studies in Comparative 
International Development. September 2003, Volume 38, Issue 3, pp 
93-109.
was applying a hardline reform. From 1991 until 
1993, YPF’s labor force shrunk from 56.000 to 
only 10.000. Such impressive accomplishment 
was achieved by a complex severance package 
that was offered to YPF workers. Some were 
simply asked to retire earlier, others took 
voluntary severance with generous compensation 
packages, and the rest were simply fired.25 
Estenssoro was hailed in the international press 
as an extremely competent manager that could 
thrive under difficult circumstances. Menem was 
also getting a lot of praise as well: Argentine 
inflation went from 1200% a year to 12%. 
International analysts were calling this “the 
Argentine miracle”; in this environment of sheer 
optimism, Menem moved ahead with YPF’s 
privatization.
In 1992, Argentina moved forward with 
the largest privatization of its history. Sixty 
per cent of the government shares were sold 
in stock markets in the United States, Europe, 
and Argentina. The deal was intermediated 
by First Boston and Merryl Lynch, which had 
close contacts with bankers from the Banco de 
Valores, Banco de Galicia y Buenos Aires and 
Banco Rio de La Plata, that were politically close 
to president Menem. This time, the privatization 
was a huge success; the shares were sold at a 
higher price than initially expected.26 
The reception of those shares in New 
York and London stock markets was impressive; 
international financiers were excited about the 
future prospects of YPF still under control of 
25  Grosse, Robert. “Financial Strategy at YPF.” Thunderbird Inter-
national Business Review 45, no. 1 (Jan, 2003): 93-104, http://search.
proquest.com/docview/202783979?accountid=11091.
Vielvoye, Roger. “Argentina on Track for Oil Industry Revamp (Part 
1).” Oil & Gas Journal, Jan 07, 1991. 24, http://search.proquest.com/do
cview/274432048?accountid=11091.
Micklethwait, John. “The Meaning of Menemism.” The Economist, Nov 
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Estenssoro. With a huge influx of foreign capital 
into a company that had already been sanitized, 
the prospects of exporting oil and gas to Brazil, 
Chile, Paraguay, and Uruguay were enormous. 
And on top of that, the Argentine government 
received  US$ 3 billion for 60% of the shares, an 
impressive sum that helped to cushion for some 
time the astounding costs of Dollarization. But, 
for now all was praise and glory for Menem and 
YPF.27
While Argentina was reforming in full 
motion, Brazil was still standing idle on all fronts. 
By 1993, Brazil was still struggling with severe 
unemployment and hyperinflation. The interim 
president, Itamar Franco, did not have a great 
reformist appetite, but the situation demanded 
action. By late 1993, Franco appointed former 
senator Fernando Henrique Cardoso as the new 
finance minister. Cardoso had a clear mandate 
to come up with a stabilization plan that could 
finally tackle inflation. 
On July 1st 1994, Plano Real started, 
and for the next six months inflation was under 
control for the first time since 1973. The early 
success of the plan catapulted Fernando Henrique 
from minister to president. During his campaign, 
Cardoso emphasized that if the country wanted 
the prosperity brought by the low inflation to 
continue, reforms of the Brazilian state had to be 
made. Analysts from abroad seemed pessimistic 
about the possibilities of Cardoso delivering the 
same kind of reforms that Menem was doing at 
that time. For those analysts, the success of Plano 
Real relied upon the ability of the Brazilian state 
to control its expenditures, keep inflation low, 
and foster a “healthy” environment for foreign 
investment.28 
27  ARGENTINA: Privatisation. Oxford: Oxford Analytica Ltd, 1992, 
http://search.proquest.com/docview/192423976?accountid=11091.
28 JAMES BROOKESpecial to The New,York Times. “Brazilians Get 
Serious on Inflation and Deficit.” New York Times (1923-Current File), 
Mar 03, 1994. 1, http://search.proquest.com/docview/109279085?acc
ountid=11091
JAMES BROOKE. Special to The New, York Times. “New Money no 
Right from the start of his first term, in 
1995, Cardoso struggled with similar problems 
faced by Fernando Collor and  Itamar Franco. A 
loose alliance of parties with distinct ideologies 
obliged Cardoso to spend political capital in 
difficult negotiations for the reform package. 
Some of the parties in the coalition were against a 
program of full privatization, in a similar manner 
to that which was happening in Argentina. The 
Brazilian government had identified energy 
and telecommunications as the two main areas 
for reform and privatization.29 Brazil was still 
dealing with the burden of servicing its foreign 
debt, and it was clear that the government did 
not have the resources to update and improve 
its infrastructure.30 Therefore, the Brazilian 
government relied on foreign capital to provide a 
fast track for modernizing its infrastructure. And 
the surplus of US Dollars generated by the sales 
of state companies would be used to cover other 
state expenditures and also serve as an extra 
stock of  reserves for the Central Bank.
Trying to compensate for what was 
perceived to be “wasted time”, Cardoso pushed 
through the Congress in 1995 a series of measures 
that intended to start the reforms. One of the most 
important was the end of Petrobras’ monopoly 
on oil extraction and refining on Brazilian soil. 
Cardoso understood that privatizing Petrobras 
was anathema for the opposition and for his 
coalition. On top of that, Cardoso himself 
believed that Petrobras was not as bad as YPF 
was before the privatization. Petrobras efficiency 
standards could not be compared with other oil 
majors such as Exxon and Shell, but for Brazilian 
standards at that time, it was a very efficient 
company. For the government, the  main problem 
Novelty in Brazil.” New York Times (1923-Current File), Jul 09, 1994. 
35, http://search.proquest.com/docview/109352362?accountid=11091
29  Hugh-Jones, S. (1995, Apr 29). Brazil: A Glass Half-Full. The 
Economist, 335, 3. Retrieved from http://search.proquest.com/docview/2
24119928?accountid=11091
30 Brazilian Debt Issuers Queue Up After Cardoso Election Win, Rating 
Review.” Euroweek, no. 373 (Oct 07, 1994): 5, http://search.proquest.
com/docview/231014347?accountid=11091.
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was that the monopoly made the company “lazy” 
in exploring the full potential of the offshore oil 
fields. Another problem that was detected by the 
Cardoso administration was the lack of capital. 
Petrobras desperately needed external funding 
and better accountability in order to modernize 
the company and make it competitive with other 
oil majors.31
The motion that ended Petrobras’ oil 
monopoly was surprisingly approved on the 
Congress in March 1995. This achievement was 
the result of the hard work of two shrewd political 
operators, the Telecommunications minister 
Sergio Motta and the Congressman Luis Eduardo 
Magalhães. Those two men not only managed to 
pass the bill and kept the coalition together, but 
did it with a comfortable majority.32 Magalhaes 
and Motta were instrumental in coordinating the 
move to other important privatizations such as 
Telebras (telecom) and Vale (mining).33 But, soon 
it became clear to the Cardoso administration 
that reforming Petrobras would not be the 
cakewalk that the Congress seemed to make it 
out to be. In May 1995, Petrobras went through 
the largest strike of its history. The powerful left-
wing labor union CUT, with the full support of 
the opposition led by the Workers Party (PT), 
brought the whole company to a halt for almost 
a month. For PT, it was a clear chance to weaken 
a new president at the beginning of its mandate. 
And for CUT, it meant a unique opportunity to 
stall the process of reform. The real reason for 
the strike was that by late 1993 president Franco, 
in one of his regular bouts of populism, gave all 
Petrobras workers pay rises of 35% followed by 
a package with a series of extra perks.34
31 “End to Petrobras Oil Monopoly Seen Imminent.” Oil & Gas 
Journal, Jun 19, 1995. 30, http://search.proquest.com/docview/2743594
84?accountid=11091.
32 “End to Petrobras Oil Monopoly Seen Imminent.” Oil & Gas 
Journal, Jun 19, 1995. 30, http://search.proquest.com/docview/2743594
84?accountid=11091.
33 Parkinson, Gerald. “Brazil Spins Off its Mining 
Conglomerate.” Chemical Engineering 104, no. 6 (June, 1997): 
47,http://search.proquest.com/docview/194413681?accountid=1
34 Espinoza, R. (1995, Jul 31). HOLY OIL. News for Brazil, 7, 8. 
The Brazilian budget had to produce a 
primary surplus due to the constraints imposed 
by the IMF for its foreign debt, but also the 
core of the stabilization plan was threatened 
by excessive expenditures that always have 
been a part of the Brazilian state. Cardoso was 
determined to put the country’s finances under 
control and he couldn’t accept the pay rises asked 
by CUT. For both sides the stakes were high, 
and soon a stalemate affected the negotiations 
between both sides. What followed was almost 
chaos, with acute gasoline shortages affecting the 
whole country. The Brazilian government had to 
purchase US$ 500 million in crude oil to supply 
the country’s needs for May, and a gasoline 
black market at the border with Argentina and 
Bolivia soared.35 In such dismal scenario, the 
Supreme Court declared the strike illegal and 
ordered the Petrobras’ workers to go back to 
work. Given the fact that for the unions and PT 
this was an admission of defeat, the workers 
refused to accept the court’s decision. With the 
popular opinion fiercely against the strike and 
the government fearing a defeat following the 
stalemate, Cardoso opted for a hardline stance. 
The president ordered the military occupation of 
all Petrobras’ installations, so that the workers 
that were willing to go back to work could do it 
so. Such an expected show of force by Cardoso 
broke the strike, since Petrobras workers now 
were fearing the threat of massive layoffs.36 In 
the end, raises and perks were not conceded, 
Cardoso’s political capital became even stronger, 
and the reforms seemed to be unstoppable.
By 1997, president Cardoso finally 
signed into law the end of the Petrobras monopoly 
on oil exploration and refining on Brazilian soil. 
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ntid=11091
BRAZIL: Petrobras Strike. Oxford: Oxford Analytica Ltd, 1995, http://
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But this was just the beginning. From 1997 
until 2000, the government sold 45% of its 
shares in Petrobras.37 The Brazilian government 
opted for a different model when compared to 
Argentina’s. Partial privatization seemed to be 
a better balance between national interests and 
a more market oriented company.38 Brazil, also 
took a step ahead when compared to Argentina 
regarding oil regulation and establishment 
of adequate standards of accountability for 
oil business in the country. In 1998, Cardoso 
administration created the National Oil Agency 
(ANP), an independent regulator whose duty was 
to provide civilian oversight for all oil entities 
that now were allowed to enter the Brazilian 
market.39 Differently from YPF, Petrobras did 
not need a major internal overhaul. The Brazilian 
company was given the exact medicine that it 
needed, more capital and a more competitive 
environment that would push it towards more 
productivity and efficiency. A stable economy 
and strong regulatory framework within a market 
friendly environment made the prospects for the 
Brazilian oil market very promising. Foreign 
analysts were talking of an “oil boom” in 
Brazil. Only between 1997 and 1998 Petrobras 
signed more than 35 joint-venture with several 
international oil giants to explore the promising 
Santos basin.40 
It is clear that the thorough reforms that 
happened to YPF and Petrobras came more as 
the result of internal political/economic needs 
37 Williams, P. (1997). Deepwater service firms to benefit from brazil’s 
opening. Oil & Gas Investor, 17(10), 22-25. Retrieved from http://
search.proquest.com/docview/224912358?accountid=110
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Caribbean Studies 35, no. 69 (2010): 231,258,288-289, http://search.
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than from blind ideological belief or direct exter-
nal intervention. Both Menem and Cardoso had 
to manage to find solutions that were politically 
feasible and financially favorable. In that sense, 
the outcome of the privatization process in each 
country demonstrated how delicate that balance 
was. Menem and his entourage focused on a 
model that put a prime on raising easy money 
from the financial markets in order to keep their 
stabilization plan working and the vast political 
machine well oiled. 
Meanwhile, in Brazil, other concerns 
shaped Petrobras partial privatization model. 
Cardoso and his economic team understood that 
full privatization of Petrobras would seal their 
political doom. And Cardoso could not buy his 
way through privatization without generating a 
major political battle within the coalition on top 
of having to deal with a fierce opposition bloc 
led by PT. For the Cardoso administration, it 
was pivotal to pass a positive image to foreign 
investors and governments that Brazil was 
shying away from old patronage practices. 
Although some horse-trading was mandatory to 
move ahead with the economic reforms, Cardoso 
did not have the luxury to indulge in that practice 
like Menem had. In the end, the constraints 
created by the Brazilian coalition presidential 
model unwittingly helped to create a more stable 
privatization model for Petrobras.
3. Turbulent transition
 By the end of 1998, the positive 
economic perspectives for Argentina and Brazil 
were fading away. Foreign investors were selling 
their financial assets in the developing world 
following the Asian and the Russian defaults 
on their sovereign debts. Although Brazil 
and Argentina were following their payment 
schedules, mega investors such as George Soros 
started to speculate against the Peso and the 
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Real.41 During this severe economic turbulence, 
both countries had to deal with higher 
unemployment and the sudden depletion of their 
Dollar reserves.42 However, YPF and Petrobras 
seemed to be living in a parallel universe. Both 
companies market value continued to soar, 
and the extra capital that was available put 
both companies in a clear strategy of business 
expansion not only in Latin America, but abroad. 
From 1998 until 2002, Petrobras and YPF 
consolidated and expanded their previous gains. 
But, it was a rough path for both companies with 
unintended consequences along the way.
By 1994,YPF was an organized 
company that had at its disposal a huge war 
chest. Jorge Estenssoro did not waste time in 
expanding YPF’s retail business in Chile, an 
important market for Argentine oil. Estenssoro 
was aiming at the acquisition of the American 
company Maxus Oil in order to have a foot in 
the US market. Estenssoro also hoped that this 
move could bring to YPF instant technological 
transference to the Argentine company. YPF, 
under Estenssoro leadership seeing the prospect 
for participation in the promising Brazilian oil 
market started to negotiate with Petrobras an 
exchange of assets that would enhance YPF’s 
presence in Brazil in all areas of the oil market.43 
But, a huge blow affected YPF and changed 
the course of the company. Jorge Estenssoro 
died in a plane crash when he was about to seal 
the Maxus Oil deal in Quito. Although some 
gossip pointed to the fact that Estenssoro had 
many enemies and that his plane was sabotaged, 
nothing has ever been proved in a court of law.44 
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Jorge Estenssoro’s death was a fatal blow to the 
new YPF. Although the company kept its original 
plan set up by Estenssoro, with the expansion in 
Brazil and the confirmation of the Maxus deal, 
the presence of its leader was missed and nobody 
in the oil industry was sure to where YPF was 
heading to.
The unexpected death of Jorge Estenssoro 
opened the door for an even more unexpected 
turn of events. By the early 1990s, the perennially 
lackluster Spanish economy was finally thriving. 
After the sedimentation of democracy following 
Francisco Franco’s long dictatorship (1938-
1975) and Spain’s ascension as a member of the 
European Union (1982), things were changing 
fast. With an investment boom from wealthier 
European economies and a comprehensive series 
of reforms, the Spanish companies were thriving 
boosted by a robust domestic demand. Spanish 
giants such as Repsol (oil), Telefonica (telecom) 
and Iberdrola (electricity) had set their sights on 
Latin America as a prosperous market for further 
expansion. Market analysts were calling this “the 
second conquest” and in Brazil and Argentina, 
its effects were being felt in a decisive way.45 
Repsol had recently being privatized by the 
Spanish state, and the company was not a part 
of the select group of the oil majors. Repsol was 
strong in refining and retailing, but it was weak 
in oil drilling. The strategy set by the Repsol 
board to make it a more complete company was 
to promote a merger with another oil company 
that had strong oil reserves and could at the same 
time serve as beachhead for new expanding 
markets. In that sense, YPF fit the mold perfectly. 
YPF had promising reserves of oil and gas and 
would help to strengthen Repsol’s position in 
what seemed to be its most promising market, 
Latin America.46
45 Ken Warn. “YPF Board Backs Merger with Repsol.” The Financial 
Times (London, England), Wednesday, May 12, 1999; pg. 32; Edition 
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After Estenssoro’s death, Repsol started 
to “flirt” with the YPF board on a possible 
takeover. YPF and politicians did not express 
any major concern and sent signs that the deal 
could move ahead. Another factor was also 
important in persuading Repsol to follow 
this course. First, the Spanish government 
lead by Jose Maria Aznar promoted a broad 
liberalization of the energy sector in Spain. The 
reform aimed to promote more competition and 
lower prices for natural gas and electricity in 
Spain. This measure started a real corporate war 
between Repsol and Iberdrola for the control of 
the Spanish energy market. Since profit margins 
in its domestic market would be thinned, it made 
sense for Repsol to look for a more profitable 
market, which Latin America promised to be. 
Moreover, Argentina had huge gas reserves that 
could be exported back to Spain .With cheap gas 
from Argentina, Repsol believed it could out 
price Iberdrola and even expand its gas sales to 
Northern Africa and Western Europe.47 
Another factor behind the deal was that 
oil prices were very low by 1998 (US$ 12.00) 
and companies were struggling to make profits. 
A wave of mergers and agreements affected the 
oil sector, such as Exxon with Mobil, British 
Petroleum with Amoco, and Elf Aquitane with 
Total. Given the challenges that the market 
presented to both companies, a merger was a 
movement that made sense at that time. By May 
1999, Repsol bought the majority stake in YPF 
from its main shareholders. The stocks were sold 
with a 25% premium over its original price in 
1993, demonstrating how the company prospered 
during those years as a private company. The 
merger shook the oil market and created one of 
the ten largest oil companies in the world.48
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Petrobras in turn, opted for a different 
model based on joint-ventures, some of them 
even included Repsol-YPF. One clear result 
from the change in the financial fortunes of YPF 
and Petrobras was the creation of an informal 
“common market” between both companies. 
Repsol-YPF moved ahead with Estenssoro’s 
plans and expanded dramatically its business in 
Brazil. They were the first foreign company that 
invested in refining activities in Brazil since the 
1970s, when they acquired a 12% stake at the 
Alberto Pasqualini refinery in Rio Grande do Sul 
in 2000. On top of that, YPF acquired several 
gas station networks from BR Distribuidora, 
increasing its presence in the booming Brazilian 
retail market.49 
 Petrobras also entered the Argentine oil 
market in a very strong way. Financially well 
positioned after the sales of 45% of its shares, 
Petrobras also acquired from Repsol-YPF a 
vast network of gas stations, a deal which gave 
Petrobras a considerable share of the Argentine 
fuel market. Petrobras also allied itself with 
Repsol-YPF in two major projects. One was that 
YPF would explore new oil fields in the Santos 
basin together with Petrobras, increasing Brazil’s 
oil output. The second project was related to 
the use of Argentine gas as a power source for 
Brazilian industry. 
For many years, Petrobras openly 
boycotted any attempt to use natural gas in the 
Brazilian industrial core, because it affected the 
profits of its monopoly on oil imports. Since 
that monopoly was effectively over by 1997, 
such attitude from Petrobras did not make 
sense anymore. And the Cardoso administration 
realized that Brazil had an energy deficit, since 
33,905. 
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the existing hydropower plants couldn’t provide 
enough energy for the post-Real economic 
boom. In that sense, natural gas from Bolivia 
and Argentina was welcome. The Brazil-Bolivia 
pipeline was being built in partnership with 
Enron and the Southern pipeline was being built 
together with Repsol-YPF.50
What it is interesting from all those 
moves in the South American oil market was 
that Petrobras and Repsol-YPF were a model 
of economic cooperation at a time when Brazil 
and Argentina were fighting a “currency war” in 
Mercosur. After the speculative attack of 1998, 
Brazil devaluated the Real while Argentina kept 
the Peso attached to the US Dollar. Immediatly, 
Brazilian products became cheaper in Argentina 
and threatened to destroy what was still left 
of the Argentine industry. While Cardoso and 
Menem were at odds, Petrobras and Repsol-YPF 
proved that from adequate economic opening 
and enhanced trade, wealth could be generated 
on both sides of the border, strengthening the 
South American energy market. Argentina was 
a natural producer and Brazil was a natural 
consumer. In that sense, both Petrobras and YPF, 
as solid companies, were perfectly positioned 
to benefit from cooperation. Unfortunately, this 
example was not followed in other areas of trade, 
and Brazil and Argentina missed a historical 
opportunity to transform Mercosur into a 
stronger trade bloc.
By the early 2000s, the optimism that 
marked the Brazilian and Argentine oil market 
slowly faded away. The rigid dollarization plan 
adopted by Argentina in 1991 was unsustainable 
at the long run, especially due to the fact that the 
Menem administration could not adapt to low 
50 “Repsol Powers on Alone in YPF Takeover Bid.” The Financial 
Times  (London, England), Saturday,  May 01, 1999; pg. 19; Edition 
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Business Review 45, no. 1 (Jan, 2003): 93-104, http://search.proquest.
com/docview/202783979?accountid=11091.
prices on the world market, and Menem’s opening 
of Argentine industry to foreign competition 
was a disaster, since it failed to increase its 
productivity or to make meaningful technologic 
strides. Repsol struggled to pay its enormous 
debt with the Spanish banks when it leveraged 
credit to buy YPF.51 After promising profits 
posted by the company in 1999, its promise of 
easy wealth for the Spaniards never materialized. 
Default on sovereign debt, economic chaos, and 
political turmoil shattered Repsol’s perspectives 
for its Argentine business. When Menem was 
gone in 2000 and the Kirchner dynasty rose 
after 2003, political meddling and populism 
marked a new stage for the relationship between 
Repsol and the Argentine government. Repsol’s 
downfall culminated with the YPF’s takeover by 
the Kirchner administration in 2012.52 And the 
fact that the Argentine government was willing 
to offer YPF something around US$ 5 billion 
(almost the same value of 20 years before) shows 
how much value the company has lost over time 
and how the constant economic turmoil made 
Argentina lose strength in the oil market.
Meanwhile, Petrobras saw its fortunes 
changing dramatically in the 2000s. Thanks 
to the civilian oversight of ANP, Brazil finally 
stopped subsidizing its oil. By playing by the 
market rules, Petrobras was seen as a solid 
investment by foreign financiers and other oil 
companies. The financial strengthening of the 
Brazilian company was related to the fact that 
it adopted a relationship based on efficiency 
with its suppliers and global standards of 
accountability.53 Although the company had some 
51 Bertrand Benolt. “Repsol to Raise Capital.” The Financial 
Times  (London, England),Thursday,  May 20, 1999; pg. 32; Edition 
33,912; 
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52 Rucinski, Tracy. Gonzalez, Andre and Gray, Kevin. “Spain’s Repsol 
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serious accidents during the Henri Reichstul 
leadership54, Petrobras during the Cardoso left a 
positive legacy. The reforms finally made it the 
strong national company that it should always 
have been. 
By 1998 Brazil produced 72% of the oil 
that the country consumed, and by 2006 Brazil 
was very close to self-sufficiency. The rise of 
oil prices during the early years of the twenty-
first century gave Petrobras even more financial 
and technological clout to explore new offshore 
fields that before 1995 were unthinkable. All the 
improvements made by Petrobras since 1995 
culminated in 2007 with the finding of one of 
the largest offshore oil reserves in the world, in 
the pre-salt layer at the bottom of the Brazilian 
coast.55 Then president Lula (2003-2010) vowed 
to explore those reserves as soon as possible, so 
Brazil could have an abundant energy supply 
for its booming economy.56 Thanks to its 
global clout, Petrobras was able to leverage the 
necessary financial resources to explore the pre-
salt layer. 
 But Lula’s administration had a different 
perspective of how Petrobras should be managed. 
Petrobras should be “less neoliberal” and had to 
go back to a stronger government control. By 
2010, the Brazilian government affirmed that 
only Petrobras would have full access to the Pre-
Ltd, 1999, http://search.proquest.com/docview/192433030?account
id=11091.
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A deadly accident with the P36 offshore platform added to several oil le-
aks on the coast sapped Reichstul authority as Petrobras’s president. He 
was accused of being negligent with safety and maintenance procedures 
in order to push for extra oil output. Reichstul resigned in 2001.
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salt reserves; foreign companies would be kept 
out. Under president Lula, Petrobras is coming 
back to its old ways. That downfall culminated 
with a series of scandals that came out in March 
2014 in an operation called Car Wash, executed 
by the Federal Police and the federal court of 
Parana state. What Car Wash unveiled was one 
of the largest corporate scandals of all time, 
one that ran through the upper echelons of the 
Brazilian government.57 The US$ 6 billion 
scandal demonstrates the legacy of the reforms 
has been disappearing fast, and blind nationalism, 
political patronage, and wastefulness. Petrobras 
is mired in debt and uncertainty, its bright future 
from the 2000s turned into dust.
In analyzing the current situation in the 
oil market of Brazil and Argentina, it is possible 
to conclude that although the neoliberal reforms 
of the 1990s were flawed in many ways, they left 
a positive legacy. Petrobras and YPF of the 1990s 
were much stronger than the ones administrated 
by the leftist governments of the Workers Party 
(PT) and the Justicialismo (Peronists). Those 
neoliberal reforms also tell a lot about the 
economic choices made by Brazil and Argentina 
over the last twenty years. In looking to these 
two countries, it is possible to realize that there 
was not a single neoliberal model that derived 
from the Washington Consensus. There were 
different “neoliberalisms” that were adapted to 
the political and economic circumstances of each 
country. 
In Argentina, Menem’s control over 
the vast patronage machine of the Justicialista 
Party allowed him to pursue a more radical 
reform than Cardoso had ever dreamed of. But 
also, Menem was more interested in his political 
survival than building a viable economic model 
57 Bello. “Whose Oil in Brazil?” The Economist [London, 
England] 14th February 2015. http://www.economist.com/news/
americas/21643224-one-many-casualties-petrobras-scandal-misguided-
industrial-policy-whose-oil
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for Argentina in the long run. That thirst for 
power led to the full privatization of YPF and 
several flawed privatizations of other public 
utilities. Argentina’s civilian oversight through 
regulatory agencies was virtually non-existent. If 
Menem wanted, he could have used Estenssoro’s 
leadership to establish a YPF that could achieve a 
balance between being a national champion and 
an efficient oil company. That lack of strategic 
planning culminated with the Repsol deal, which 
had more to do with the elites making global deals 
than with the wellbeing of Argentina. Repsol was 
not committed to the development of Argentina 
as a nation, and the fact that it struggled with 
political meddling and persistent economic crisis 
only made the situation impossible. The gains 
made by Estenssoro in the early 1990s were lost 
in the economic maelstrom of the early 2000s 
and in the political meddling of Kirchnerista 
populism. YPF became a minor player in the 
Latin-American oil scene, a far cry from the 
hailed company of the 1990s. 
In the Brazilian case, it reveals that 
the neoliberal model adopted by the Cardoso 
administration was “milder” when compared 
to the one implemented by Menem. Given the 
fragmentation of the Brazilian political system 
(coalition system), the distaste that some 
members of Cardoso’s cabinet had for traditional 
patronage and the fierce oversight by the PT 
opposition, President Cardoso did not have the 
same room for a radical reform as Menem had. 
Cardoso himself believed that a balance had to 
be found between, capital, labor, and national 
interest. In that sense, most of his cabinet was in 
favor of the partial privatization model attached 
to a strong regulatory agency (ANP). That 
model, embodied a softer pro market approach, 
one that could mingle better with traditional 
Brazilian economic and social structures .It 
brought good results to Petrobras and paved the 
way for Brazil’s impressive economic growth 
during Lula’s administration.
It is also possible to conclude that the 
reforms were necessary at the moment they 
were made. Despite what several intellectuals 
argue, those companies were losing money and 
were adding to the national debt. Both Petrobras 
and YPF were inefficient at their core business. 
The neoliberal reforms changed that and both 
companies became more efficient and regained 
market share. But, it cannot be denied that 
those reforms were made at great social and 
environmental costs. 
Most of the former workers of YPF 
couldn’t find a proper job after the massive 
layoffs of 1992 and 1993.  Some were hired 
again, but now as out sourced contractors, that 
got lower wages than an average YPF worker. 
YPF’s largesse also provided the only economic 
activity for many poor communities in the 
countryside of Argentina. After the reforms, 
most of those cities were left without anything, 
and they were not included in the short period 
of prosperity brought by Menem’s economic 
measures. 
In Brazil, the push for self-sufficiency 
in oil made Petrobras a company prone to 
errors and environmental disasters like oil 
spills and platform accidents.58 That side effect 
of Petrobras expansion should have been more 
studied by Brazilian historians. Although Brazil 
had a strong environmental regulation system 
after the 1988 Constitution, Petrobras frequently 
breached those regulations. The company still 
had major strides to make, but still the reforms 
were able to find the right balance between 
national interest and market efficiency.
58 Adriana Lieders. A New Chapter in Brazil’s Oil Industry: Opening 
the Market While Protecting the Environment. Georgetown Internatio-
nal Environmental Law Review. 2001;13:781-1013
Wagner, J. P. (2001). Disaster strikes. Petroleum Economist, 68(5), 
32-34. Retrieved from http://search.proquest.com/docview/197409191?
accountid=11091
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Finally, it is possible to conclude that 
the consecrated concept about neoliberalism 
and Latin America cannot be confirmed in this 
study. There was no verifiable direct influence or 
colonialist behavior by the American government 
or the IMF in the reforms implemented ay YPF 
and Petrobras. There was certainly the support of 
the financial markets and its investors, but their 
attitudes were not related to anything that the US 
government told them to do. 
For the foreign investors in the 1990s, 
Latin America promised substantial gains. For 
the governments of Brazil and Argentina, foreign 
capital was vital to promote the modernization 
of their oil industry and to guarantee the 
consolidation of their stabilization programs 
though the improvement of the national Dollar 
reserves. Reforms are always a work in progress. 
Any country that leaves reforms behind as a 
less important item of its agenda is doomed to 
lose space in the global economic competition. 
Reforms are usually unpopular by their very 
nature; as they challenge entrenched political/
economic interests and have grave social 
consequences, politicians very often shy away 
from them. It does not matter if reforms were 
neoliberal or not, what historians must pay 
attention to it is if they were necessary and fairly 
effective in the historical context to which they 
belong. In that sense, in order to promote a better 
understanding of the recent oil history of Latin 
America, historians must leave behind the sacred/
profane logic when analyzing the history of such 
important national companies as Petrobras and 
YPF. The only profanity in the end has nothing 
to do with neoliberalism, but is related with one’s 
inability to provide a more balanced analysis that 
may provide a better understanding of a such 
complex topic in a turbulent period of Latin-
American history.         
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